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We investigate the inuence of foreign monetary policy decisions on the volatility of
the Irish stock market. Specically, we examine the inuence of US monetary policy
announcements on the ISEQ. We nd evidence of the so called calm before the storm i.e.
there appears to be a decline in volatility on the day prior to an FOMC meeting and
a subsequent increase in volatility after the results of such meetings are made known.
We also nd evidence to suggest that ISEQ volatility is inuenced by surprise changes
in US monetary policy. Moreover, US monetary surprises appear to aect Irish stock
return volatility asymmetrically. In particular, higher than expected US federal funds,
tend to increase Irish stock return volatility. This paper represents an important step
in addressing the issues of spillover identication between the US and the Irish stock
market.1 Introduction
With increasing global nancial integration, returns in markets tend to move in concert,
with changes in one market leading to spillovers in others both in terms of returns and
volatility. Moreover, asset market participants pay close attention to the release of both
foreign and domestic economic news which may aect asset returns. In this paper, we
examine the inuence of US monetary policy decisions on both returns and volatility of the
Irish stock market. In particular, we focus on three aspects of the transmission of news
with respect of monetary policy.
Firstly, do regularly scheduled meetings of the Federal OpenMarket Committee (FOMC)
have an inuence on the volatility of the Irish stock market? In the nancial press, there
is anecdotal evidence to suggest that markets enter a lull prior to the release of important
information. In the wake of an announcement, traders react to such information leading to
an increase in activity. This pattern has been dubbed the calm before the storm. Secondly,
markets react to new information, hence one would expect a greater response in terms of
trading activity if there is an unanticipated element to any information revealed. How
does ISEQ returns and volatility respond to surprises in US monetary policy? Finally, we
investigate whether volatility of the ISEQ reacts dierently depending on whether there is
an unexpected increase or decrease in policy rates.
Our study represents to our knowledge the rst attempt to address possible causes of
volatility spillovers for the case of the ISEQ. Previous research has examined the relation-
ship between various stock markets and the degree to which there are spillovers between
markets, see for example, Gallagher (1995) and Gallagher & Twomey (1998) in an Irish
context.1 However, this begs the question, what is the driving force behind a change in one
market leading to a spillover in another? We focus on one important source, US monetary
policy announcements. In addition, our study is also motivated by recent ndings which
indicate that foreign news is an important factor in explaining stock market volatility, see
for example, Connolly & Wang (1998).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section gives a brief description
of some of the recent empirical work in the area and the key ndings. Section 3 discusses the
methodology adopted in the paper, while section 4 reports the empirical results. Finally,
1Gallagher & Twomey (1998) measure the impact of international spillovers on returns and volatility in
the Irish stock market.
1section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Recent research has explored the inuence of economic news on asset prices, e.g. studies
have examined the impact of ocial announcements of real and nominal variables on stock
returns both in terms of their mean and volatility eects. Real variables examined include
GDP and unemployment gures while nominal variables include ination, money supply
gures as well as interest rate decisions. Flannery & Protopapadkis (2002) focus on domestic
news in the US, while Connolly & Wang (2003) focus on the impact of both domestic and
foreign news between the US, UK and Japan respectively.
The inuence of an announcement on an asset price needs to be separated into two
components. Firstly, there is the institutional nature of the announcement i.e. many
ocial announcements are xed in the calendar and don't impart new information of their
own accord. However, markets appear to be less volatile just prior to such announcements.
The impact on volatility prior to the announcement, the preannouncement eect or the
calm before the storm, has been described by Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998) and is
both intuitively appealing and appears to be borne out by empirical evidence, see Li and
Engle, (1998) and French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1989). Bomm (2003) nds that there
is a reduction in S&P volatility on the day prior to a FOMC meeting and an increase in
volatility on the day of the meeting.
Secondly, the announcement may impart new information to market participants as it
may dier from what had been anticipated. If markets are ecient, assets should react to
the unanticipated element of the announcement rather than the announcement itself and
hence market returns should not respond to the expected component of announcements.
Theory has less to say about how the surprise element of an announcement aects volatility.
Flannery & Protopapadkis (2002) focus on the impact of the unanticipated component
in 17 macroeconomic announcements (both nominal and real variables) on US stock returns
and their volatility. They nd that only money supply surprises aect both the mean and
variance of returns. In terms of cross country spillovers, Connolly & Wang (1998,2003)
examine the inuence of the surprise element in six macro series on stock returns between
the US, Japan and the UK. They nd that macroeconomic news plays a larger part in
explaining volatility linkages than return linkages. They also nd evidence which suggests
2that foreign news is likely to be more important than domestic news in explaining domestic
stock market volatility.
Finally, there is the possibility of asymmetry, i.e. the impact of an unexpected negative
announcement has a larger impact on volatility than an unexpected positive announcement.
This is consistent with the leverage eect (Black, 1976) and the volatility feedback hypoth-
esis, French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1989).2 Bomm (2003) found that unanticipated
rises in the Fed funds target rate tend to have a larger eect on S&P volatility than unan-
ticipated declines. Connolly & Wang (1998) found that volatility spillovers between US,
UK and Japan depend on whether the announcement was good or bad news. In particular,
bad news from the UK and US was found to lead to signicant increases in volatility in
Japan.3
Our study is closest in spirit to that of Bomm (2003). We examine the impact of FOMC
announcements and their surprise element on the mean and volatility of Irish stock index.
Our measure of the surprise element of monetary policy is derived from the one-day change
in the US fed funds futures contract.4 In contrast to studies such as Connolly & Wang
(1998,2003) and Flannery & Protopapadkis (2002), we believe our measure of the surprise
element of monetary policy decisions is superior as it is closely related to the fed funds
rate i.e. the rate targeted by the US monetary authorities. Research by Gurkaynak, Sack
& Swansom (2002) suggests that the fed funds futures contract dominates other market
instruments at forecasting the fed funds rate. Previously mentioned studies have used
an inappropriate instrument such as the growth rate of the money supply and(or) their
measure of expectations is more problematic as it is not available at a daily frequency.
3 Methodology
Our methodology draws on the recent work of Bonm (2003), Jones et al. (1998) and
Anderson and Bollerslev (1998). Our model is as follows;
ISEQt+1 = 0 + 1FFFt + 2ISEQt + 3S&Pt + ut+1 (1)
2The leverage eect reects the fact that a fall in the value of stock price of a rm causes its debt-equity
ratio to rise. The perception by shareholders is that their future cash ows are now more risky.
3Flannery & Protopapadkis (2002) did not investigate asymmetric responses.
4A number of authors such as Bomm (2003), Kuttner (2001), Poole & Rasche (2000) have used this








t) = 0 and E(e2
t+1j
t) = ht+1 and E(u2
t+1j
t) = st+1ht+1 (4)
ht+1 = 0 + 1ht + 2e2
t (5)
The dependent variable in the conditional mean equation is the 1-day percentage change
in the Irish market, ISEQ, while the independent variables include the 1 day change in
both the federal funds futures, (FFF), and the S&P 500 (S&P), as well as the lagged
one day percentage change in the ISEQ while ut+1 is the unexplained element of Irish stock
returns. The unexplained element can be thought of as comprising a non-normal stochastic
element, et+1, whose conditional variance is time varying and st+1 a dummy to indicate the
impact of particular day eects. The st+1 dummy can be written as;









t is a dummy variable set to one on days when there is a regularly scheduled
US Federal Reserve policy meeting and zero elsewhere.
We focus on three issues. Firstly, does ISEQ volatility follow a pattern which is consis-
tent with the calm before the storm, i.e. is volatility lower on days prior to FOMC meeting
and higher on the day of the announcement. In equation (6), a nding of a calm before the
storm would be evident if the coecient 1 was negative and statistically signicant, while
0 was positive and statistically signicant.
Secondly, we examine whether there is any news eect i.e. whether a surprise change
in the federal funds rate target has an eect on ISEQ returns. This would be reected in
a negative statistically signicant value of 1.
Finally, we also test whether the news eect has any inuence on ISEQ volatility and
whether positive and negative shocks in the US have an asymmetric eect on the volatility
of Irish stock returns.
44 Data and Empirical Results
We use daily data from June 1989 to June 2003.5 The data used is taken from Datastream
and Bloomberg. The study uses closing prices for the ISEQ index and the S&P 500 index.
The actual change in the federal funds target rate is obtained from the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors. The unanticipated change in the federal funds target rate is proxied by
the 1-day change in the price of the 1-month ahead 30-day Federal Funds futures contract,
as traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).6 We use the one month ahead contract
as suggested by Poole & Rasche (2000) given it is easier to calculate and is less inuenced
by liquidity issues around FOMC meetings.7
4.1 Empirical Results
All models are estimated using the quasi maximum likelihood procedure outlined in Boller-
slev & Wooldridge (1992). We also include day of the week dummies in all specications.8
In terms of our proxy for surprise element in monetary policy decisions included in the
mean equation, FFFt, we restrict attention to days when a monetary policy decision
was made. This is done in order to control for the inuence of other variables that may
aect asset returns.9 In particular, we examine both the one day change in the fed funds
futures on FOMC meeting days (Bredin et al 2003) and the the one day change in fed
funds futures on FOMC meetings days and days of unscheduled rate changes (Bernanke &
Kuttner 2003).10 The results are shown for each measure in tables 1 & 2 respectively. As
5The following two periods are dropped from the sample. The 18
th of April 2001, which was associated
with largest surprise change in the Fed funds rate during the sample period and the 11
th to the 17
th of
September 2001 when the US stock market was closed as a result of the terrorist attack. See Bernanke &
Kuttner (2003) for a detailed discussion of the data.
6The change is Ft  Ft 1, where t is the day of the policy announcement. The change in the ISEQ index
(data taken from Datastream) must take account of the time dierence between the US and Ireland and
hence is calculated as (Pt+1   Pt)=Pt, where t is the day of the policy announcement.
7Kuttner (2001) uses the current month contract while Bonm (2003) uses both the current and one
month ahead contract.
8The results for the days of the week dummies are not reported in the results section, but are available
from the authors.
9This is based on an event study methodology where by focusing on a small window one hopes to reduce
the impact of other factors aecting the results. However, all other variable are measured at a daily frequency
for the full sample period.
10Bernanke & Kuttner (2003) use this to determine their sample in their event study of the eect of US
monetary policy changes on US stock returns.
5can be seen in both cases the coecient on the shock in the mean equation is negative and
insignicant i.e. it would appear that the shock to US monetary policy does not signicantly
inuence ISEQ returns.
We next address the question of whether volatility in Irish stock returns follows a pattern
which is consistent with the calm before the storm, in other words, we test whether there are
any pre-announcement eects. As discussed earlier, the pre-announcement eect if present
is independent of the actual policy decision. As can be seen from table 1 to 2, there is
distinct evidence in favor of a calm before the storm eect. Volatility is lower on the day
prior to the announcement (1) and higher on the day of the announcement (0).11
However, to properly assess the importance of such pre-announcement eects it is useful
to distinguish between scheduled meeting days and days where there was an unscheduled
change in rates. In the latter, since by denition, they are unscheduled one may not expect
to see a calm in the market prior to such a change. On the other hand, markets are fully
aware of scheduled FOMC meetings. Moreover, for our sample period there is a large
proportion of unscheduled rate changes.12
To take account of this we modify our variance equation













to distinguish between scheduled and unscheduled meeting days where IF is a dummy
variable which is equal to one for scheduled FOMC meetings and IUC is a dummy variable
which equals one when there was an unscheduled rate change. In table 3, we report the
results for such a specication and nd there is a reduction in volatility prior to scheduled
meetings i.e. 1 is signicantly negative while there is an absence of such an eect prior to an
unscheduled rate change, 4 is insignicant. However, for both scheduled and unscheduled
meetings we do witness a signicant increase in volatility on the day of a meeting, i.e. 0
and 3 are positive and signicant.
So far we have not taken into account how the Fed has communicated its decisions
to the market place. Prior to February 1994, the Fed did not announce its policy rate
decisions directly. Instead the market would glean the Fed's intentions by the actions of
the Open Market Desk on the day after a meeting. Since 1994 the Fed publicly announces
11Although not reported here, signicant days of the week eects were found. Volatility appears to be
higher on both Mondays and Fridays.
12Over the full sample there are 24 unscheduled rate changes.
6its decisions immediately after each FOMC meeting. Bonm (2003) found evidence of pre-
announcement eects restricted to the post 1993 period for the US. Moreover, post 1993,
there has been very few unscheduled rate changes with most rate changes occurring at
scheduled FOMC meetings, see table 4.
Based on these two observations we restrict our sample to post 1993 and focus on
scheduled FOMC meetings. A natural question then to ask is whether there is a dierence
in market participants reaction to a scheduled FOMC meeting where rates were changed
or when they stayed the same. In particular, we re-specify the variance equation to













where ISC and ISN are dummy variables that take the value of one when there was a
rate change or no rate change respectively and zero otherwise. These results are reported
in table 5. In the case of scheduled rate changes we nd a statistically signicant calm and
storm eect. Moreover, we also see that the coecient on the storm for a scheduled rate
change is considerably larger than that in previous results. However, there appears to be
lack of statistical evidence in favour of either a calm or storm when there was no change in
the policy rate.
We next investigate both the impact of the surprise element of policy rate decisions
on volatility and following the work of Black (1976) whether positive and negative policy
shocks have a symmetric impact on volatility. Turning to the rst element, does volatility
respond to the surprise element of a monetary policy decision or does it merely respond to
the decision to change rates. The variance equation is modied






t+1 + FFF SC
t (9)
such that we include an addition term which captures the surprise element of any interest
rate decision. FFF SC captures the extent to which markets are surprised by a policy
rate change at scheduled FOMC meeting. A non zero value for this variable indicates that
markets hadn't fully anticipated the interest rate change.
We report the results of this specication in table 6 and nd that the surprise element
of US monetary has a positive statistically signicant eect on ISEQ volatility which is
above and beyond the fact that the policy rate has changed. The surprise element clearly
imparts new information to market participants which aects volatility.
7Finally, recent empirical evidence has found that negative surprise announcements have
a greater impact on volatility, see French et al, (1989) and Nelson (1991). This is consis-
tent with the leverage eect (Black, 1976) and the volatility feedback hypothesis, French,
Schwert and Stambaugh (1989). To account for this possibility we modify the volatility
equation such that






t+1 + +FFF +SC
t +  FFF  SC
t (10)
where we separate out positive and negative surprises in the change in the fed funds rate
These results are reported in table 7. As can be seen, positive and negative shocks do not
have a symmetric impact on volatility. A positive policy surprise, i.e. a higher than antic-
ipated rise in the policy rate, increases stock market volatility by signicantly more than
negative surprises. The Wald test with a null of no asymmetry in volatility is comfortably
rejected. This nding is consistent with the studies of Bonm (2003) and Connolly & Wang
(1998).13
5 Conclusion
In this study we examine the inuence of US monetary policy decisions on the volatility of
the Irish stock market. In particular, we examine the inuence of announcement eects of
the FOMC meetings on ISEQ returns and volatility. We nd clear evidence of announce-
ment eects. There is a decline in volatility of the ISEQ on the day prior to a FOMC
meeting and a rise in volatility when the results of the meeting are made known and hence
we nd evidence in favour of the calm before the storm eect. We test the impact of the
news eect of US policy on both Irish returns and volatility. Irish stock return volatility
do appear to be inuenced by the US shock and the response is asymmetric. A negative
policy surprise, lower than expected policy rate change, reduces stock market volatility by
signicantly more than positive surprises.
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10Table 1: Impact of US Monetary Policy Shocks on Volatility on Irish Stock
Returns (F=FOMC Meetings only)
ISEQt+1 = 0 + 1FFF F
t + 2ISEQt + 3S&Pt + ut+1




















Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unanticipated
change. The t statistics are robust using the procedure from Bollerslev & Wooldridge
(1992).
11Table 2: Impact of US Monetary Policy Shocks on Volatility on Irish Stock
Returns (Union = FOMC Meetings plus unscheduled rate changes)
ISEQt+1 = 0 + 1FFF union
t + 2ISEQt + 3S&Pt + ut+1




















Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unanticipated
change. The t statistics are robust using the procedure from Bollerslev & Wooldridge
(1992).
12Table 3: Impact of US Monetary Policy Shocks on Volatility on Irish Stock
Returns (Using Union, FOMC Meetings and un-scheduled changes)
ISEQt+1 = 0 + 1FFF union
t + 2ISEQt + 3S&Pt + ut+1





























Hypothesis test (P-values for Wald statistics)
1=4=0 0.00
Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unanticipated
change. The t statistics are robust using the procedure from Bollerslev & Wooldridge
(1992).
13Table 4: FED Announcement Procedure
Event Full Sample Sample 1 Sample 2
(1989-2003) (1989-1993) (1994-2003)
FOMC Meeting days 114 37 77
Scheduled Rate Change 33 5 28
Unscheduled Rate Change 24 20 4
Total Announcements 57 25 32
14Table 5: Impact of US Monetary Policy Shocks on Volatility on Irish Stock
Returns: Post 1994 (FOMC Meetings and Scheduled (No)Change)
ISEQt+1 = 0 + 1FFF F
t + 2ISEQt + 3S&Pt + ut+1





























Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unanticipated
change. The t statistics are robust using the procedure from Bollerslev & Wooldridge
(1992).
15Table 6: Impact of US Monetary Policy Shocks on Volatility on Irish Stock
Returns: Post 1994 (FOMC Meetings and Scheduled Change)
ISEQt+1 = 0 + 1FFF F
t + 2ISEQt + 3S&Pt + ut+1






















Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unanticipated
change. The t statistics are robust using the procedure from Bollerslev & Wooldridge
(1992).
16Table 7: Impact of US Monetary Policy Shocks on Volatility on Irish Stock Re-
turns - Testing for Asymmetry (SA): Post 1994 (FOMC Meetings and Scheduled
Change)
ISEQt+1 = 0 + 1FFF F
t + 2ISEQt + 3S&Pt + ut+1
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Hypothesis test (P-values for Wald statistics)
+= =0 0.00
Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unanticipated
change. The t statistics are robust using the procedure from Bollerslev & Wooldridge
(1992).
17